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Introduction 
The election year 2017 was one that numerous international media and observers predicted 
to be a showdown between “populists” and their opponents, all the more so after “Brexit 
and Trump.”  What made the Dutch, French, and German elections all the more intriguing 
was that they pitted apparently populist challenges from the left and right against embattled 
ruling blocs – with outgoing Grand Coalitions in the Netherlands and Germany as well as a 
French administration struggling with record-low approval ratings – that had been at the 
center of crisis management politics in the Eurozone.  The stage appeared to be set for what 
Yannis Stavrakakis (2014) had theorized in the Greek context as a dominant line of conflict 
between populism and “anti-populism”: competing constructions of “the people” being met 
by a neo-liberal elite presenting itself as the only alternative to the “populist threat.”  The 
first question that arises, then, is to what extent electoral campaign discourses in these 
countries indeed featured anti-populism in this sense: namely, as an equivalential 
construction of a populist threat spanning the left, right, and perhaps even the center as a 
flexible marker (indeed, as a “tendentially empty signifier”) for all challenges to the dominant 
economic rationality as the only viable path for managing the crisis.  A related question from 
a discourse and hegemony analytic perspective is to what extent “populism” as an analytical 
category – based on the work of Ernesto Laclau (2005a, 2005b) in particular – as opposed to 
a discursive effect of anti-populism is applicable to the various left-wing and far-right party 
discourses in these countries and to what extent they indeed pose counter-hegemonic 
challenges to the technocratic crisis management discourses that Stavrakakis’s theory links 
with anti-populism.  As such, the analysis is embedded in a theoretical account going back to 
Laclau’s (1990, 1996/2007, 2005a; 1985/2001 with Mouffe) theory of the political as well as 
Mouffe’s (2000, 2005a, 2005b) critique of “post-politics,” of which Stavrakakis’s theory of 
anti-populism can be read as a continuation – with both diagnoses notably pointing to the 
paradox that the drawing of antagonistic frontiers as an ontological effect of “the political” 
can also play out in “extra-political” ontic registers, as in the moralizing exclusion of 
“populists” by “the democrats” representing the post-political or post-democratic consensus.  
Yet the question is also, conversely, to what extent elements of technocratic crisis 
management discourses are reproduced as sedimented hegemonic effects in the discourses 
of “populists” – especially those on the far right whose constructions of “the people” rely on 
“reductionist” closure onto an essentialized community (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014; 
Stavrakakis et al. 2017; Kim 2017). 
 
From the “political difference” to post-politics to anti-populism 
The starting point for the understanding of post-politics and anti-populism to be discussed 
here is the discourse and hegemony theory formulated by Laclau (1990, 1996/2007, 2005a) 
as well as the early joint work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985/2001).  Laclau presents a 
                                                
* The author would like to express his sincere thanks to the participants of the workshop “Rethinking the 
Concept of Politicization” at the University of Hamburg for their comments on an earlier draft.  All translations 
of original source material into English – and any errors contained in them – are the author’s own. 
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discursive social ontology that Marchart (2007, 2013) has subsequently theorized as “post-
foundational”: if all social reality is understood as constituted discursively through the 
production of differences, then a system of differences can only constitute itself by 
equivalentially articulating a common identity of its elements through a common negative 
frontier – an antagonistic frontier that represents a political moment of institution of “the 
social” as an indeterminate collection of discursive elements – against a constitutive outside.  
Yet any such attempt at representing a whole out of a collection of parts – which Laclau 
refers to as hegemony – is contingent and constitutively inadequate, as no act of institution 
can definitively fix the identities of differential signifiers and thus bring about a closure of the 
social space.  In this vein, what we call “society” is always the (partly sedimented, i.e. 
naturalized and de-politicized) hegemonic effect of previous iterations of antagonistic 
demarcation – of the citizenry against the aristocracy, of the nation against a foreign power, 
of labor against capital – that made contingent representations of a social whole possible, yet 
any hegemonic order – including attempts to fix the meaning of society around some 
universally valid telos, whether it be class struggle, modernization, or some other forward 
march of history – will encounter dislocations, or moments in which the hegemonic 
representation of the social space is displaced and interrupted (Laclau 1990). 
In a move typical for post-foundational theories that thrive on the “political difference” 
(Marchart 2007), therefore, the instituting function of the political as antagonism emerges 
from the absent ground of the social – the impossibility of its closure as a determinate, 
sutured totality – and the productive role of this impossibility for “politics” as the never-
ending struggle for hegemony between contingent representations of “society.”  Laclau 
(1996/2007, 2005a) goes on to argue that this latter operation relies on the production of an 
“empty signifier” that represents and thus constitutes an equivalential unity by reducing its 
own differential particularity down to the level where it can function as a stand-in for the 
absent fullness of a whole constitutively blocked by the antagonistic Other.  In Laclau’s 
(2005a, 2005b) theory of populism, the name of “the people” takes on this function of an 
empty signifier that represents an equivalential chain of unfulfilled demands as an absent, 
unredeemed fullness against a locus of “power” unable or unwilling to fulfill them – thus 
pointing to a constitutive gap between “the people” as the subject of democracy and the 
“power” promised to it (which Canovan (2002) has also theorized as “the democratic 
paradox”).  Laclau (2005a: 154) goes so far as to assert in this vein that “the political 
becomes synonymous with populism” – with the construction of a “people” being “the 
political act par excellence” – and thus a “moment of institution of the social.”  Thus, 
populism is understood not as a determinate content or a fixed state of affairs, but as an 
articulatory logic that characterizes discourses that are structured (recurrently and over 
many articulations) around an opposition between the nodal point “people” and “power,” 
but may also emerge fleetingly any time a “people” is interpellated against “power” – just as 
the political as the irreducible dimension of antagonism and, indeed, the ontological 
precondition for politics always comes back as the (re-)instituting moment of a field of 
differential coordinates. 
 Mouffe’s (2000, 2005a, 2005b) critique of “post-politics” is founded precisely on this 
understanding that politics cannot exist outside the political, i.e. without antagonism, and 
that even a hegemonic order built on the promise of conflict-free rational consensus cannot 
reproduce itself without ultimately resorting to the drawing of antagonistic frontiers.  Post-
politics, according to Mouffe, is the illusion that politics is grounded in rational consensus 
and deliberation, without the need for such frontiers; the “neo-liberal hegemony,” in effect, 
is built on a post-political promise by positing a rational consensus on the proper economic 
policy that transcends established left-right divisions and indeed incorporates “Third Way” 
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social-democratic parties that have accepted the dominant economic rationality and thus 
abandoned the terrain of “adversarial politics.”  Neo-liberalism, in this sense, can be 
understood as a hegemonic displacement of the frontier that long constituted the political 
space in many democracies: namely, from left vs. right to rational/right vs. wrong; it follows 
that the hegemonic consensus tends to dismiss challenges to it as irrational1 and, indeed, 
articulates this conflict “in the moral register” (Mouffe 2005a: 56) between those in the right 
and those in the wrong.  In this context, Mouffe (2005a: 51) understands the rise of right-
wing populism as a “consequence of the post-political consensus” that challenges the post-
political understanding of politics with its appeal to a sovereignty of “the people” against “the 
elite,” thereby inducing the neo-liberal mainstream to constsitute itself equivalentially as a 
hegemonic bloc – albeit in the moralizing terms of “the good democrats” against “the evil 
extreme-right” (Mouffe 2005a: 57).  The political as antagonism, in other words, makes its 
return as a Lacanian symptom (Žižek 1989; Stavrakakis 1999, 2007; Arditi 2005) that appears 
to extend the hegemonic claim to stand for what is “right” but, in so doing, also points to 
the limitations of the post-political promise of politics as a conflict-free, consensus-driven 
field. 
 A complication arises from this diagnosis, however.  Mouffe (2000, 2005a, 2005b, 
2013), while sharing the Laclauian premise of the ontologically constitutive role of the 
political, draws from this the ethico-normative imperative of “agonistic pluralism”: if 
antagonism is an ontological necessity for politics, then political actors ought to recognize 
the constitutive role of conflict as a condition of their coexistence – and not as a Schmittian 
struggle with the war of annihilation as its horizon – through some form of acceptance of 
legitimate political opposition around a common commitment to “liberty and equality for all.”  
Against this normative standard, right-wing populism can be viewed as especially problematic, 
from Viktor Orbán’s claim following his first election defeat in 2002 that “The nation cannot 
be in opposition” to Alexander Gauland’s assertion that there is a conspiracy of “the parties 
represented in the Bundestag” to “replace the German people” through “human flooding.”  
More generally, “right-wing populism” can be understood as the site of a tension between 
populism and reductionism, whereby the equivalential articulation of “the people” against 
some kind of power bloc tends to coexist with attempts to fix the identity of “the people” 
around some kind of a priori privileged differential particularity such as an ethnic, cultural, or 
nativist essence (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014; Stavrakakis et al. 2017; Kim 2017).  Thus, 
right-wing populist discourses can be seen as normatively problematic from an agonist-
pluralist perspective – as immigration and its proponents are often constructed as an 
existential threat to the one and only true “people” – but also as ambivalent in terms of 
politicizing post-political hegemonies: indeed, reductionist discourses that seek to delimit the 
boundaries of “the people” around some kind of “transcendental signified” (Stravrakakis et al. 
2017) can have deeply anti-political implications from a post-foundational perspective.  This 
point will be taken up again in connection with anti-populism in the next section. 
Stavrakakis’s (2014) theory of anti-populism can be understood as a further 
development of Mouffe’s post-politics thesis “in the shadow of the European crisis.”  
Stavrakakis argues that, on the one hand, neo-liberal crisis management discourses in the EU 
point to a “post-democratic” hegemony grounded in the promise of stable governance 
oriented to the demands of the markets and not of the people (a thesis that has clear 
resonances not only with Rancière (2009), but also with Streeck’s (2013) notion of the 
“consolidation state”); on the other hand, “the return of the people” with the rise of 
populist discourses gives rise to an anti-populist reaction whereby the hegemonic bloc 
                                                
1 See, for instance, Thomas Friedman’s dismissal of anti-WTO protesters in Seattle as “a Noah’s ark of flat-
earth advocates, protectionist trade unions and yuppies looking for their 1960s fix.” 
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constitutes itself as the only alternative to “populism” as the main threat to democracy.  This 
has a number of key implications: the populist threat is constructed as “omnipresent” – 
indeed, as an empty signifier in its own right – to be found on the left, right, and center, thus 
equivalentially linking discourses that do not link themselves equivalentially (e.g. Syriza and 
Golden Dawn, Mélenchon and Le Pen); moreover, as Rancière (2016) also points out, anti-
populism itself constructs a “people” – one that is irresponsible, irrational, and therefore 
susceptible to populism (Stavrakakis 2014: 509-10).  As with post-politics, the anti-populist 
antagonistic frontier emerges as a symptom that, on the one hand, showcases the hegemonic 
bloc’s commitment to technocratic rationality – albeit as an internal frontier that points to 
the limitations of an attempt to organize the social field along differential-technocratic lines; 
the ontologically constitutive role of the political means that no hegemony can go on 
reproducing itself without drawing a frontier of constitutive exclusion and thus making its 
own (otherwise sedimented) hegemonic institution explicit. 
Paradoxically, however, both Mouffe and Stavrakakis suggest that this return of the 
political generates forms of contestation that are somehow not properly political: the 
struggle for hegemony plays out “in the moral register” (Mouffe 2005a: 56) or even, in the 
case of anti-populism, with an “extra-political, anthropological” inflection – that is, by 
constructing populism as “opposed to rationality and common sense” (Stavrakakis 2014: 
510).  As previously noted, the post-political and post-democratic logics of invoking some 
form of objective rationality thus find their extension in the constitutive exclusion of those 
who challenge this rationality; the political as a formal category that implies the ontological 
necessity of a frontier of constitutive exclusion does not exclude the possibility that this 
frontier is then articulated in such arguably extra-political terms as moral rectitude, objective 
correctness, or even belonging to some kind of essentialized community such as nation, race, 
religion, or – an increasingly popular alternative – “civilization.”  This latter example suggests 
the ambivalence of “right-wing populism” as a challenge to post-political or post-democratic 
hegemonies: such discourses are “populist” (and to some extent counter-hegemonic) insofar 
as they construct an opposition between “the people” and “power,” but there is always 
some degree of countervailing tendency within these discourses in the form of a reduction 
of “the people” onto an a priori essentialized community2 – which De Cleen and Stavrakakis 
(2017) as well as Brubaker (2017) have variously theorized as a “horizontal” in/out-group 
exclusion as opposed to the “vertical” populist opposition of people vs. power.  To take a 
simple example: it is easily conceivable (indeed, as will be the case in Geert Wilders’ PVV) 
that a right-wing populist-reductionist discourse would circumscribe its opposition to the 
ruling bloc accordingly – for example, for sending “Dutch people’s” money to Greece and 
for failing to stop “Islamization,” but not necessarily for cutting healthcare and education 
budgets. 
What, then, would a properly “political” struggle for hegemony look like?  Here, the 
implicit boundaries of Laclau’s (2005a, 2005b) professedly “ontological” concept of populism 
(which serve as a key reference point for both Mouffe and Stavrakakis) can be seen: on the 
one hand, Laclau theorizes populism in formal terms as the preponderance of an 
equivalential over a differential logic in a discourse – with the premise, however, that the 
basic unit in the field of discourse is a “demand” that interpellates a locus of “power” as 
capable of either rejecting or fulfilling it; an equivalential articulation of demands, then, entails 
a common negative dimension of non-fulfillment that generates a frontier of constitutive 
exclusion against this locus of power.  It follows from this that Laclau consistently refers to 
                                                
2 In the influential theories of Mudde (2004), Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012, 2017), and Müller (2014, 
2016), this combination of an appeal to a pure, homogeneous people and a moralized opposition to an elite (as 
well as some form of anti-pluralism) is generalized onto a concept of populism as such.     
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the two sides of a populist antagonistic frontier as “people” and “power” and thus ends up 
privileging the vertical opposition of people (as “underdog”) vs. power as the founding 
moment of politics.  It is in this context that Mouffe (in her later work: Errejón & Mouffe 
2015; Mouffe 2018, forthcoming) and Stavrakakis (2014; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014) 
advocate a left-wing populism that challenges post-political or post-democratic hegemonies 
on the basis of this vertical people vs. power opposition – and, indeed, extends this frontier 
onto an opposition to domination in all its forms, not least economic, racial, and sexual.  A 
key question for empirical analysis is to what extent left-wing populist discourses actually 
pursue such a strategy in displacing neo-liberal and right-wing populist-reductionist frontiers 
alike – and to what extent this is indeed met by a neo-liberal anti-populism that interpellates 
left- and right-wing populism equivalentially and even constructs the reductionist elements of 
right-wing populism, such as ethnic or nativist-grounded exclusion, as problems of “populism” 
rather than of nativism or racism (Stavrakakis et al. 2017). 
It is possible to formulate an analytic concept of anti-populism on the basis of the 
preceding theoretical considerations, yet with a number of open questions that an empirical 
discourse analysis would have to answer.  Anti-populism entails the equivalential 
construction of “populism” as a threat to the democratic order and thus as a marker that 
can be flexibly applied via the interpellation of a subject position as standing outside this 
order.  Thus, “populism” becomes a tendentially empty signifier and equivalential links are 
attributed to discourses that do not see themselves as equivalentially linked: an example 
from the 2017 Czech parliamentary election campaign would be a Civic Democratic Party 
(ODS) election poster that depicted ANO leader Andrej Babiš alongside the Communist 
Party (KSČM) and far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) leaders to highlight the 
threat of “Populists and communists” coming to power – and thus as a threat to the post-
1989 democratic order – even though Babiš himself repeatedly ruled out a coalition with the 
KSČM and SPD.3  According to Stavrakakis (2014), however, anti-populism also constructs 
populism as opposed to the dominant economic rationality – and thus (in an act of 
hegemonic displacement par excellence) presents the defenders of this dominant economic 
rationality as defenders of the democratic order against the populist threat.  There is a 
myriad of examples for this in the articulations of decision-making elites across the EU, such 
as in Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso’s reaction to the 2013 Italian general 
election results: 
I hope we are not going to follow the temptation to give in to populism because of 
the results in one specific member state […] The question we have to ask ourselves 
is the following: should we determine our policy, our economic policy, by short-term 
electoral considerations or by what has to be done to put Europe back on the path 
to sustainable growth? For me the answer is clear (Reuters 2013). 
The “populist threat” can find equivalential extension onto a range of other issues – as seen, 
for example, in Council President Herman van Rompuy’s designation of “populism” (and not, 
for example, racism or xenophobia) as a threat to “the free movement of persons within our 
borders,” which he went on to defend as a “sign of civilization” (EUObserver 2012). 
                                                
3 It should be noted that ANO subsequently shifted its strategy after the election to pursue equivalential links 
with the KSČM and SPD in a number of areas (e.g. in the election of parliamentary committee chairs) and that, 
at the time of writing, an ANO minority government tolerated by both parties remains a possibility; in the 
context of the pre-election campaign, however, the observation that ANO (as well as the KSČM and SPD, in 
large part) avoided an equivalential link and the ODS nonetheless constructed them as one bloc still holds.  
This example is also suggestive of a structural similarity between anti-populism and anti-communism, which has 
often entailed accusations of social democrats and social liberals secretly harboring equivalential links with 
Leninists (which are, in turn, denied by the former – a common strategy of the ODS against the Czech Social 
Democratic Party in the post-1989 period). 
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 As these observations suggest, it is possible to think of anti-populism in gradations: it 
may be possible to speak of a “thin” anti-populism, for instance, if the populist threat is 
constructed equivalentially but not linked to an opposition to neo-liberal economic 
rationality (as in the case of Babiš who, as the originator of the promise to “run the state like 
a business,” could hardly be accused of economic irrationality) or if the populist threat is 
localized onto a particular form or party (as will be the case in Dutch case, where “populism” 
tends to be reduced onto the figure of Wilders).  Yet the 2017 elections in the Netherlands, 
France, and Germany offer particularly interesting case material where it would be possible 
to expect anti-populism in the strong sense as theorized by Stavrakakis, as they pitted prima 
facie populist challenges from the left and right against embattled ruling blocs – featuring 
outgoing Grand Coalitions in the Netherlands and Germany as well as consecutive (and 
historically unpopular) iterations of center-right and center-left government in France – that 
had been at the center of decision-making in the crisis management politics of the EU.  The 
empirical analysis that follows examines the field of populism and anti-populism in these 
three cases: to what extent was not only anti-populism present, but to what extent did these 
prima facie populist discourses of the left and right indeed pose counter-hegemonic 
challenges to the wider crisis management discourses and to what extent is “populism” as an 
analytical category – based on the understanding of Laclau (2005) as presented here – as 
opposed to as a discursive effect of anti-populism indeed applicable in these contexts?  
The method used here is the expanded framework of Essex School discourse analysis 
as developed by Nonhoff (2006, 2017) and Marchart (2017).  The basic Essex School 
paradigm, which draws on the discourse and hegemony theory of Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985/2001) to conduct discourse analysis centered on the identification of relations of 
difference and equivalence as well as their structuration around nodal points (Howarth & 
Stavrakakis 2000), has been expanded with Nonhoff’s (2006, 2017) introduction of the 
concept of contrariety to refer to relations of negatory exclusion among individual elements; 
an antagonistic relation is thus understood to consist not only of two opposing equivalential 
chains, but also of relations of contrariety between individual elements across the opposing 
chains – with the empty signifier playing a representative function by taking on relations of 
contrariety with the greatest number of elements on the opposing side.  Marchart (2017) 
proposes in the context of protest movements that a discourse can be analyzed in terms of 
its demand structure, contrariety structure, and subjectification structure: in addition to a 
differential or equivalential articulation of demands (in contrariety to other demands), 
therefore, a discourse entails the interpellation of subject positions (e.g. the working class, 
the precariat) as part of an imaginary collective unity tied to these demands.4  This aspect is 
particularly useful for the analysis of party discourses in relation to coalition signaling, i.e. 
whether other parties are marked as incompatible or as desired partners for a potential 
coalition.  The main research questions, then, can be reformulated in the following terms: to 
what extent multiple party discourses converge around anti-populist interpellations of 
“populism” of the left and right as an opposing bloc and in what ways left-wing and right-
wing populist discourses differ in their demand and subjectification structures – in particular, 
to what extent they indeed exhibit a “populist” subjectification structure organized around 
the nodal point “people” against “power” tied to a strongly equivalential demand structure in 
contrariety to the crisis management politics of the “power” bloc. 
  
Analyses 
                                                
4 This concept thus refers back to the Althusserian category of “interpellation” as the ideological production of 
subject positions and is understood as such throughout this paper. 
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Netherlands 
Background 
The Dutch case is notable for the early emergence of the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) as an 
“exceptional case” of a “militant” liberal nationalist discourse that constructed an opposition 
between liberal values, including women’s and gay rights, and the supposed intolerance and 
backwardness of Islam (Akkerman 2005).  Fortuyn’s discourse could thus also be understood 
as “civilizationist,” pitting “backward” Islam against “modern” Dutch attitudes and explicitly 
positing a “clash of civilizations” between “Judeo-Christian humanistic culture” and “Islamic 
culture” (Brubaker 2017: 1194-96).  Tied to this was an element of populism directed against 
the established political parties, yet with the contrariety articulated primarily in terms of 
social and economic policy rather than Islam or immigration; Fortuyn (2002) published a 
book in time for the 2002 election campaign on The Ruins of the Eight Years of Purple – with 
“purple” being a (also more widely used) signifier for the Grand Coalition government of 
Labor (PvdA) and the liberal right (VVD) – but focused his critique mostly on issues of 
healthcare and other public services; in a 2002 interview, he proclaimed that “CDA, PvdA or 
VVD, it’s completely the same.  They are part of the elite that people intuitively or 
intellectually see that has to be broken open” – and when asked how he came to this 
realization, pointed to “purple” mismanagement of the national rail company and the health 
sector (De Volkskrant 2012). 
 The discourse of Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV), formed ahead of the 2006 
election, has built on Fortuyn’s civilizationist discourse by combining liberal attitudes toward 
abortion, euthanasia, and LGBT rights with a rejection of “intolerant and backward Islam” 
and declaring that “our Judeo-Christian culture is far superior to Islam” (Vossen 2011; 
Brubaker 2017: 1197).  This took on a clearly populist inflection in the party’s 2010 election 
program, which formulated the underlying problem thus: “elites are knocked loose from 
reality and are doing things on their own that ordinary people are not getting better off out 
of” (Partij voor de Vrijheid 2010) – and tied this to an equivalential chain of demands not 
only “for Islam suppression and against mass immigration,” but also “for security,” “for a 
social Netherlands,” “for a better environment,” and even “for animals, farmers and 
fishers”.5  After the 2010 election, however, the PVV reached an agreement to tolerate a 
minority government of the VVD and CDA; the agreement, titled “Freedom and 
responsibility” and centered on wide-ranging spending cuts to counteract the Dutch 
“competitive fall,” promised measures “to limit the migration of low-opportunity migrants,” 
tackle the “important problem” of “illegal immigration,” and “intensif[y]” a “return policy” of 
deporting immigrants without legal status – while also emphasizing the two coalition parties’ 
recognition of “Islam – unlike the PVV – as religion” (VVD & CDA 2010).  This center-right 
strategy of differential incorporation of PVV demands lasted until April 2012, when Wilders 
walked out of budget negotiations citing disagreements over further spending cuts affecting 
pensions, declaring a “definitive” break with the coalition and stating that “we do not accept 
that the elderly pay for the nonsense Brussels demands” on budgetary policy (NU.nl 2012). 
 The Socialist Party (SP) has been classified as “left-wing populist” in a number of 
influential approaches (Mudde 2004; March 2011), with March (2011) arguing that the party’s 
clear anti-establishment profile in the 1990s has given way to a “post-populist” democratic 
socialism since the 2000s.  Indeed, when the party peaked electorally with 16.6% in the 2006 
election, its program was centered on the more traditionally socialist nodal point “more 
                                                
5 This set of demands is particularly meaningful for illustration because it points to the PVV’s attempt to 
equivalentially incorporate demands already prominently represented by other parliamentary parties in the 
discursive field (namely the Socialist Party, GreenLeft, and the Party for the Animals, respectively). 
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solidarity” as an answer to the “major concerns over care, social security, and safety” but 
also the “fear of more criminality and ethnic tensions” – while conspicuously lacking a 
recurring, overarching signifier for the power bloc, apart from the notable, but more 
localized, articulation of contrariety to the threat of a “European superstate” and the 
rejection of “even more Brussels paternalism” (Socialistische Partij 2006).  Populism was a 
stronger element in the SP’s 2010 and 2012 campaigns – with the 2010 program blaming 
“politicians from the right to the left” for falling for the “neoliberal thought” that had led to 
“the crisis of casino capitalism” and the 2012 program designating an entire spectrum of 
parties from GreenLeft to PVV as complicit in “the government of VVD and CDA” that 
“cuts billions from the citizens”; in both cases, the SP presented itself as the alternative for a 
“social government,” thus highlighting the combination of populist and socialist discursive 
structuration characteristic of the SP (2010, 2012). 
The 2017 campaign 
On May 7, 2016, Wilders (2016) announced the PVV’s election priorities with a simple tweet: 
“Core PVV election program: more boss over own country; de-Islamize; borders shut, riff-
raff out; billions to the Dutch ordinary man/woman”.  In August 2016, the PVV released its 
2017 election program on a single A4 sheet; under the title “Netherlands ours again,” the 
document centered on the demand to “de-Islamize the Netherlands,” including a 
moratorium on all refugees as well as immigrants “from Islamic countries,” a ban of the 
Koran, and the closure of all mosques, in addition to making “the Netherlands independent 
again” by leaving the EU (Partij voor de Vrijheid 2017).  The nationalist nodal point “the 
Netherlands” in contrariety to “Islam” consistently structured the PVV discourse in the 
campaign, culminating in the Wilders-Rutte TV debate two days before the election in which 
Wilders declared, “I want the Netherlands to become the Netherlands again, and Islam does 
not belong to it” and appealed to voters, “If you want the Netherlands to become ours again, 
chase that man [Rutte] away and put me on that tower” (De Standaard 2017).  There was, 
then, little actual populism in the sense of a central people-power opposition in the PVV 
campaign discourse; while the signifier “ordinary people” had been used previously and again 
in the Wilders tweet – and the one-page program included the demand “citizens get power” 
through binding referendums – this clearly did not play the recurring structuring function of 
a nodal point.  The lack of a populist interpellation of a power bloc encompassing a wide 
spectrum of forces is particularly surprising given that the outgoing government, just as in 
the 2002 election with Fortuyn’s rise to prominence, was a Grand Coalition of PvdA and 
VVD (albeit with a VVD prime minister); the common populist strategy of equivalentially 
interpellating the main parties of the left and right, or even coming up with signifiers such as 
“UMPS” or “PPSOE,” was conspicuously absent from the PVV discourse. 
 The SP’s campaign discourse, centered on the program title and social media hashtag 
#PakDeMacht (“take the power”), was a more strongly populist one that articulated a 
central contrariety between the nodal point “a social Netherlands” and “the politics of the 
elite” tied to a call for a “politics not only for the elite, but for everyone” (Socialistische 
Partij 2017).  The party thus interpellated an “elite that is richer after the crisis than before it” 
thanks to government policies: “The gap between the high earners at the top and the rest of 
the population has increased deliberately through the government.  Premier Rutte has taken 
good care of the directors and managers, of the banks and multinationals” (Socialistische 
Partij 2017).  This central opposition was tied to an equivalential chain of demands that 
featured calls for a single-payer national health system, minimum wage and pension rises, 
investment in social housing, “equal rights for all Dutch” by fighting labor-market 
discrimination and “bifurcation and segregation” in schools and neighborhoods – as well as a 
continued rejection of “Brussels coercion,” criticism of the EU as a “project that undermines 
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democracy and gives all space to multinationals,” and a call for “a referendum on a new 
European Union”; also included was a pledge to “prevent migration flows” by improving 
development aid and ending “unfair trade,” while also “respect[ing] and implement[ing] the 
Refugees Treaty” (Socialistische Partij 2017).  The SP, while far from incorporating the PVV’s 
flagship policies in these areas, likewise articulated a contrariety to both the EU and 
“migration,” albeit in terms of the “social” values that structured its equivalential chain. 
 While the SP’s social-populist discourse articulated a more direct counter-hegemonic 
challenge (and across a wider range of demands) to a ruling power bloc than the PVV’s 
nationalist one, therefore, it is worth noting the symptomatic internal limits within both.  As 
already seen, the first Rutte cabinet took office with a technocratic promise to curb the 
Dutch “competitive fall,” above all with spending cuts and limits on immigration – an agenda 
that Wilders supported until he drew a line at “the elderly” as the target for such cuts; the 
second Rutte cabinet continued this line with the central pledge to lead “the Netherlands 
stronger out of the crisis” with detailed tables of spending cuts designed to increase 
“purchasing power” and encourage “entrepreneurship,” with Rutte also promising ahead of 
the election “no cent more to Greece” (VVD & PvdA 2012).  When Rutte argued in his 
March 2017 debate with Wilders that “The most important promise I made to the voters in 
2012 was to bring the Netherlands out of the crisis.  That has now happened,” Wilders 
responded that “You were not going to send more money to Greece, but that has happened” 
(De Standaard 2017).  Wilders thus displaces the Rutte cabinets’ technocratic crisis 
management discourse in a nationalist direction by maintaining that the only way its promises 
can be fulfilled is by leaving the EU framework altogether, while not questioning the 
rectitude of these promises; this is also the case with refugee policy, with the PVV demand 
for “borders shut” feeding on Rutte’s appeal to would-be refugees in 2016 “to stay home.”  
The SP, on the other hand, positions itself within this hegemonic framework in constructing 
migration – and labor migration, with an SP MP even declaring in February 2017: “Own 
workers first! That is not Trump, that is not PVV, that is SP” (NOS 2017) – as a threat, yet 
with the articulation of this threat around the “social” nodal point still setting it apart from 
the VVD and PVV discourses. 
 The election campaign was characterized by anti-populist articulations by 
spokespersons of the VVD, PvdA, D66, and GreenLeft, yet of a largely “thin” variety 
localized onto the PVV as representing the populist threat.  In the case of Rutte, who 
articulated the threat of “wrong populism” in technocratic terms as a source of “chaos” with 
the Brexit and Trump victories, this threat was localized onto the PVV and pitted against the 
VVD as the only force capable of stopping it: “The risk with such a small difference [in 
opinion polls] with the VVD […] that ultimately a result comes out where the PVV is bigger 
is huge” (BNR 2017).  Yet while telling Wilders in the TV debate that “I will never work with 
you” (De Standaard 2017), Rutte continued to pursue a strategy of differential incorporation 
of PVV demands, as with his widely publicized appeal to immigrants: “If you do not like it 
here, leave the country, leave!” (Trouw 2017).  Arguably the “thickest” anti-populism was 
found in PvdA leader – and Rutte’s vice-premier – Lodewijk Asscher, who criticized Rutte 
for this remark and called him “a thin strain of a populist,” thus linking his own coalition 
partner to “the evil” of populism (De Telegraaf 2017).  This flexible application of the populist 
threat as a highly equivalential category was a rarity, however, with D66 leader Alexander 
Pechtold (2016) equating populism with the figure of Wilders (as well as Trump, Boris 
Johnson, and Norbert Hofer) as “a conservative, nationalist mishmash without ideals of 
community.  Hate and fear is what binds them.”  The reduction of “populism” onto the right 
found a notable left-wing agonist inflection in GreenLeft leader Jesse Klaver (2016), who 
declared that “I want to be an alternative to right-wing populism with progressive parties – 
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PvdA, D66 and SP”; Klaver thus coupled a thin (anti-PVV) anti-populism with an agonistic 
displacement of the frontier onto left vs. right and even named the SP as his most preferred 
coalition partner in a newspaper poll.  Speaking after the results came out on election night, 
Klaver asked the GreenLeft supporters, “Has populism broken through?” – inducing chants 
of “No!” – while Pechtold declared that “Here in Netherlands the populist noise has 
stopped” and Rutte stated that “Netherlands says ‘stop’ to wrong populism” (Bregman 2017; 
NU.nl 2017). 
 A key application of the theory of anti-populism in the Dutch case is the way in which 
Rutte’s technocratic anti-populism and Wilders’ nationalism mirror each other: as noted, 
Wilders displaced Rutte’s crisis management discourse in a nationalist direction, while 
Rutte’s hegemonic claim consisted precisely in the promise that only the VVD and its 
management of the crisis can prevent “wrong populism” from coming to power.  The VVD’s 
strategy of hegemonizing the wider demand for anti-populism also meant interpellating the 
PVV as its main challenger; this “thin” anti-populism largely ignored the explicitly counter-
hegemonic social populism of the SP, as opposed to linking it with the PVV threat as a “thick” 
variant might have done.  The SP, for its part, circumscribed its counter-hegemonic claim by 
articulating a contrariety to migration – in contrast to GreenLeft, which extended its 
counter-hegemonic claim of speaking for a “progressive” bloc and a “realistic majority” with 
its demand for Greek debt relief and a liberal refugee policy (Trouw 2016).  GreenLeft’s 
success in the election suggests that its strategy of positioning itself outside the nationalist vs. 
thin anti-populist dichotomy on the key issues of EU and migration was more successful (if 
only slightly) in interpellating a “progressive” bloc against the right than the SP strategy of 
interpellating a popular camp against “the elite.”   
 
France 
Background 
The case of the National Front (FN) in France is notable not least for its changing inflections 
of populism and reductionism.  It has been noted that an attempt at “normalization” took 
place leading up to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s first-round success in the 2002 presidential election, 
with the party dropping a number of ethno-reductionist demands from its program such as 
mass repatriation of non-European immigrants (Shields 2014).  Marine Le Pen, who took 
over the leadership in 2011, has explicitly pursued a strategy of “de-demonization,” including 
purging the party’s discourse of explicitly anti-Semitic and homophobic elements and even 
working toward equivalential incorporation by displacing the antagonistic frontier onto a 
common one against Islam – as exemplified in her assertion that it is unsafe in some places 
“to be a woman, a homosexual, a Jew, or even French or white” under the “Muslim 
occupation” of the country (Le Parisien 2016).  Whether the FN discourse remains 
predominantly reductionist on the question of sexual orientation is ambiguous; when then-
MP Marion-Maréchal Le Pen articulated a reductionist defense of “the traditional and natural 
family” against homosexuality and suggested that the legal status of same-sex marriage in 
France could lead to legal recognition of polygamy, Marine Le Pen dismissed the connection 
to polygamy (Le Parisien 2016), while having maintained, in her 2012 presidential program, 
opposition “to all demands for creation of same-sex marriage” coupled with an acceptance 
of same-sex unions within the PACS framework (Le Pen 2012). 
Le Pen’s 2012 campaign was characterized by an increasing emphasis on populist 
opposition to the main parties of the left and right, designated by the signifier “UMPS”; her 
program, titled “The Voice of the People, the Spirit of France,” promised a “total break with 
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the politics of the UMPS” in relation to “the utmost priority” of restoring full employment as 
well as “the choice of the UMPS” of “reducing wages and dismantling the system of social 
protection” in order to retain the euro, which she rejected with reference to both social 
security and national sovereignty (Le Pen 2012).  The party’s long-standing demand for 
“national preference” for French nationals in jobs and social services was reformulated as a 
“national priority […] applied to all French, whatever their origin,” indicating the loosening 
of ethno-reductionist closure (Le Pen 2012).  It is worth noting that Nicolas Sarkozy, much 
like in his 2007 campaign, attempted to dislocate this anti-UMPS frontier by presenting 
himself as the outsider candidate and appealing to “the people of France, to the France that 
suffers” in demarcation from “our elites” – a strategy that was less successful than in 2007 
not least due to his subject position as incumbent and the lack of an articulation of this 
people-elite opposition around issues of social insecurity (Mondon 2014: 306-08).  
 The 2012 election was also notable for the candidacy of Jean-Luc Mélenchon for the 
Left Front (FG), which had been initially formed as a joint list incorporating both the French 
Communist Party (PCF) and the Left Party (PG; a left-wing split from the Socialist Party (PS)) 
for the 2009 European Parliament election.  Mélenchon presented a left-wing populist 
discourse tied to a strategy of mass open-air rallies – under the slogan “Place [or square, 
place] to the people!” – and of interpellating “the people” equivalentially with “the left,” as 
exemplified in the slogan “The Left Front is the front of the people”; the joint FG program, 
“The Human First,” declared that “The Left Front is rightly born out of the need to reinvent 
the left by leaning on the popular implication” and called for a “citizens’ revolution” against 
the “financial oligarchy,” with a participatory constituent assembly leading to a 
“parliamentary Sixth Republic” (Front de Gauche 2012).  It is worth noting that Mélenchon 
adhered to the left vs. right camp logic long established in French politics in appealing to 
“our political family, the world of labor and its demands” to support François Hollande 
“without demanding anything in exchange for beating Sarkozy” in the second round (France 
TV Info 2012).  In August 2014 – after a disappointing result for the FG in its second 
European election – Mélenchon announced the intention “to federate the people” in a new 
movement for a Sixth Republic, signaling a break from the FG framework; in February 2016, 
he announced the formation of La France Insoumise (FI; “Unsubmissive France”). 
 
The 2017 campaign 
For the 2017 presidential election, Le Pen (2017) presented a program titled “144 
Presidential Commitments,” declaring that “The object of this project is first to give France 
its liberty and voice to the people” and that the presidential election will be “a choice of 
civilization” between two visions: “The ‘globalist’ choice on one hand, represented by all my 
opponents, which seeks to destroy our great economic and social equilibria, which wants the 
abolition of all frontiers, economic and physical” and “the patriotic choice […] that puts the 
defense of the nation and the people at the heart of all public decision and that, above all, 
wants the protection of our national identity, our independence, the unity of the French, 
social justice, and the prosperity of all.”  The articulation of this patriotism vs. globalism 
frontier in “civilization[al]” terms, with “the people” – featured prominently in Le Pen’s 
campaign slogan “In the name of the people” – being referred back to the signifier “nation” 
and lacking an opposing signifier like “UMPS” interpellating some kind of power bloc against 
it, meant that Le Pen’s discourse was now primarily nationalist rather than populist.  While 
the EU was marked as an external locus of power in contrariety to the demand of “restoring 
to the French people its sovereignty (monetary, legislative, territorial, economic),” this took 
the form of a more localized contrariety rather than a nodal point structuring the discourse 
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– the latter function being played rather by the aforementioned “patriotism” signifier that 
also linked demands for “a new patriotic model in favor of employment” as well as an 
“economic patriotism” favoring “French agricultural products” and even renewable energy 
investments. 
 Mélenchon, using the campaign slogan “The force of the people,” again campaigned 
on a left-wing populist discourse, yet with the key difference that he positioned himself 
outside the framework of the political parties, including the PCF-associated left camp.  In 
announcing his presidential candidacy for FI at the PCF media festival in September 2016, 
Mélenchon (2016) declared that “I am a candidate outside the parties but I am not a 
candidate against the parties,” while introducing the new program, “The Future in Common,” 
as a populist reiteration of “The Human First”: “If it’s the human first, then the human is all 
men, all women, whatever his/her social condition, whatever his/her education, whatever 
his/her religion […] which is the mass of the French people.”  The program opened with a 
renewed call for a Sixth Republic through which “the sovereign people must redefine our 
democratic rules and define anew social, ecological, and emancipatory rights” as well as 
abolish “the presidential monarchy” that serves “the oligarchy and the caste in power” (La 
France Insoumise 2017).  The nodal point “people” took on a structuring function in linking 
demands for a justice system “in the name of the people,” a “popular cultural policy” as 
opposed to “culture for a minority of the privileged” – but also alongside the more 
traditional left-wing signifier “solidarity” referring to a “solidaristic protectionism” (as 
opposed to the FN’s “patriotic” articulation of this demand), a “solidarity tax” on wealth, 
and “a guaranteed and solidaristic retirement.”  
 Mélenchon’s strategy was thus centered on turning the FN’s people-as-nation into a 
floating signifier and re-articulating it around new oppositions.  Notable in this regard was 
Mélenchon’s (2017a) speech in front of a mass rally “for the Sixth Republic” on March 18, 
2017, in which he repeatedly interpellated “the people” gathered before him as the subject 
of a “citizens’ revolution” – even citing Victor Hugo to proclaim that “The name of France is 
revolution” – against “the presidential monarchy,” against “the privileges of finance,” but also 
against the dual menace of “an ethnic coup d’état or a finance coup d’état,” explicitly 
opposing “the extreme right that would like the ethnic nation.”  In denouncing a “European 
Union that confiscates the sovereignty of the people and submits it to the sovereignty of 
money,” Mélenchon blamed it for “encourag[ing] the most blind nationalisms and the most 
absurd xenophobias,” thus preserving the contrariety to the FN’s nationalism even on the 
terrain of critique of the EU.  Mélenchon’s balancing act of opposing “the people” to both 
nationalism and financial oligarchy can be seen in the specific articulations of demands 
superficially similar to the FN’s – as already seen in “solidaristic protectionism,” all the way 
to “control[ling] the causes of migration that are wars, climate warming, and free trade” 
while “reaffirm[ing] the right to asylum” and “respect[ing] the human dignity of migrants” (La 
France Insoumise 2017). 
 In this context, the ultimately successful strategy of eventual winner Emmanuel 
Macron was not an anti-populism that lumped Mélenchon and Le Pen together, but a 
hegemonization of an anti-nationalist frontier against Le Pen tied to a re-articulation of the 
floating signifier “patriotism” and a populist contrariety to “the system.”  Macron claimed to 
stand for an “open patriotism” that represented “the French spirit” in demarcation from 
“narrow nationalism and the reduction onto a chimeric identity, and on the other hand a 
blissful multiculturalism”; at a campaign rally, Macron denounced “the project of 
multiculturalism” for “nourish[ing] communitarianism” – thus incorporating one of the FN’s 
favorite targets – but also “the reactionary forces” bent on “stigmatiz[ing] those who do not 
resemble the idea that they make of France” (20minutes 2017).  At a TV debate ahead of the 
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first round, Macron denounced Le Pen’s support for leaving the Eurozone as “economic war” 
and declared that “nationalism is war” (BFMTV 2017).  At the same time, Macron positioned 
his candidacy outside the framework of established parties and as one that “comes to upset 
the established order because it worries the system,” as he declared at his first open-air rally 
in July 2016 (Boudet 2016).  While the notion of Macron being “anti-system” was 
immediately derided by political opponents, Macron’s strategy hinged on being able to draw 
his frontier of constitutive exclusion against nationalism and the system – indeed, being 
supposedly the only anti-nationalist but patriotic candidate not part of the system.  On 
election night after the first-round results were announced, Macron (2017a) declared in his 
speech that he wanted to be “the president of the entire people of France, the president of 
patriots in the face of the menace of nationalists” who “breaks to the very end with the 
system that has been incapable of responding to the problems of our country for over 30 
years.”  
 Macron, in interpellating nationalism as his opponent rather than populism, displaced 
Le Pen’s patriotic vs. globalist frontier by turning “patriotism” into a floating signifier while 
insisting that “I am not a rootless multiculturalist globalist”; he even accepted the label 
“populist” for himself with the reasoning that “If being populist is speaking to the people in 
an understandable way without intermediary apparatuses, then I sure want to be populist. 
[…] So call me populist if you want” (Le JDD 2017).  Ironically, the most anti-populist 
articulations came from the François Fillon campaign – which itself made use of populist logic 
in appealing to “the people” while opposing (and taking up Le Pen’s signifier) “government of 
judges” – in branding Macron as a case of “worldly populism” and hailing the Dutch election 
results as a victory “against populism and extremism” that provided hope for the battle 
against “the extreme right” in France (Le Parisien 2017; Le Point 2017).  In presenting himself 
as the alternative to the FN, Macron, the former Minister of Economy under Manuel Valls 
(2014-16), took up a key element of the technocratic reform discourse of the Valls cabinets 
that, in a latter-day French iteration of TINA, had defended wide-ranging neo-liberal reforms 
(such as the contentious Labor Law, a.k.a. El Khomri Law) by interpellating the FN as the 
only alternative to them: “Is there an alternative politics to what we are doing?  Yes, there is, 
it is what the extreme right is proposing”; Valls even remarked to Matteo Renzi in this vein 
that “There is no alternative on the left, the only other deal is the National Front” 
(Lacassagne 2015).  It is worth noting that while Valls had declared his intention to “go all 
the way” with labor reform, Macron said in a May 2016 interview that he would go even 
further than the El Khomri Law (Les Echos 2016) – and, in his presidential program, called 
for a “society of work” that would “free labor and the spirit of enterprise” by, for example, 
“reduc[ing] the cost of labor” for employers still further (En Marche! 2017); at least part of 
his contrariety to “the system,” then, was for not going far enough with neo-liberal labor 
market reforms. 
 The two-way contest of Macron and Le Pen in the second round thus suited the 
strategies of both camps: on election night, Le Pen once again rallied “the patriots” against 
“the globalists” and, in a populist moment, subsequently appealed to Mélenchon voters by 
incorporating part of Mélenchon’s constitutive outside against Macron – “It is the project of 
Macron that is built entirely for the benefit of the oligarchy, the great financial powers and to 
the detriment of labor” (Paris Normandie 2017) – while Macron (2017b) reaffirmed the 
equivalential link between the FN and “the system” not only in terms of a common negative 
frontier, but a direct causal link: “It’s the system of old political parties that has nourished 
the National Front for so many years.”  Mélenchon (2017b), for his part, retained his dual 
constitutive outside by opposing the “two candidates who approve and want to extend, both 
of them, the current institutions” in the interest of “mediacrats and oligarchs,” refusing to 
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make a recommendation for the second round apart from not voting for the FN.  The 2017 
French case, then, comes close to something of a populist conjuncture, in which populism as 
a dynamic articulatory logic was used in shifting constellations across a spectrum of 
candidates – with Mélenchon’s, Macron’s, Le Pen’s, and even Fillon’s discourses exhibiting 
varying degrees of populist structuration and Macron, on the night of his election, quickly 
shifting gears onto an institutionalist discourse that, in the name of bringing the nation 
together, no longer pitted “the people” against a constitutive outside; particularly notable is 
Macron’s use of populism against “the system,” yet partly as a continuation of a technocratic 
reform discourse that interpellates the FN as the only alternative and presents itself as 
capable, unlike “the system,” of overcoming it – indeed, precisely by placing itself outside 
“the system.” 
 
Germany 
Background 
The Alternative for Germany (AfD) is another notable case of shifting iterations of right-
wing populism and reductionism, albeit within a much shorter timeframe.  Since its founding 
in 2013, the AfD has shifted from a “competition populist” (Bebnowski & Förster 2014; 
Bebnowski 2015) discourse, in which “the people” and German “competition” interests 
jointly structured a negative frontier against “the Altparteien” primarily with reference to the 
euro and banking bailouts, toward an ethno-culturally reductionist construction of “the 
people” as the “only 64 million native-born Germans” built on “the classical family” as “the 
nucleus of society and state” in the discourses of Björn Höcke and Alexander Gauland, yet 
also coexisting with partial openings toward the LGBT community in the Berlin context in 
particular through a displacement of the frontier onto a common one against “Muslim 
immigrants” (Kim 2017).  The AfD discourse, by linking “the people” with a biological 
essence under existential threat from “human flooding” initiated by “the Altparteien,” displays 
the highest degree of reductionism of the far-right discourses examined here, but is also 
notable for its consistent structuration in contrariety to the power bloc “Altparteien” as well 
as Angela Merkel’s heavily technocratic discourse of “Alternativlosigkeit” around the euro and 
banking bailouts that the party (beginning with its name) directly challenges. 
 On the left, the discourse of Die Linke (“The Left”) can be understood as a joint 
articulation of the more traditionally socialist nodal point “social justice” with a left-wing 
humanist populism pitting “the people” (or “the human beings”; die Menschen) against the 
“profit” interests represented by the “neo-liberal consensus.”  Since its founding in 2007, the 
party has recurrently deployed the slogan “People before profits” – often in conjunction 
with demands such as “Against Hartz IV” and “Against the care emergency” – while 
opposing the banking bailouts with the slogan “A safety net for the people” and defending a 
liberal refugee policy in terms of “human dignity.”  In the face of the AfD’s reductionist turn 
and dramatic rise in the 2016 regional elections in particular, Die Linke co-chairs Bernd 
Riexinger (2016) and Katja Kipping (2016) have pursued a strategy of displacing the frontier 
onto a “conflict between top and bottom and not between inside and outside” and calling 
for a “revolution of justice” or a “social offensive […] that benefits all people” – while 
parliamentary group co-chair Sahra Wagenknecht has generated controversy by attempting 
to partly incorporate the AfD’s constitutive outside by criticizing Merkel’s decision to 
suspend the Dublin Agreement – which she also blamed for “mak[ing] the AfD strong” in 
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the first place (Focus 2017) – thus highlighting a difference in strategy within a broadly left-
wing populist orientation.6   
 
The 2017 campaign 
The election year 2017 began with markedly anti-populist articulations by Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) general secretary Peter Tauber, who compared Free Democratic 
Party (FDP) chairman Christian Lindner with “Mr. Gauland from the AfD” and referred to 
Die Linke as a “red AfD,” declaring that “Sahra Wagenknecht and [AfD co-chair] Frauke 
Petry are the twin sisters [das doppelte Lottchen] of populism in Germany”; he ruled out any 
form of cooperation with Die Linke and the AfD and added that “I expect such a clear 
demarcation from the SPD and Greens as well” (Die Welt 2017).  This textbook case of anti-
populism entailed the construction of “populism” as a highly equivalential category that 
marked opponents across the spectrum (who themselves did not articulate equivalences 
with each other) and thus defined the frontier of legitimate democratic politics; 
Wagenknecht herself criticized this strategy as an attempt to “make the AfD the reference 
point of politics” (Focus 2017).  This anti-populist strategy continued after the selection of 
Martin Schulz as SPD chancellor candidate in January, with Finance Minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble (CDU) referring to Schulz as “almost literally Trump” for using the slogan “Make 
Europe great again” and criticizing Schulz’s style “at a time when the temptation of populism 
has increased worldwide” (Spiegel Online 2017). 
 This anti-populist course continued primarily in the form of the CDU’s hegemonic 
interpellation of the SPD as its main challenger that, unlike itself, is incapable of upholding the 
democratic frontier against populist challenges from the left and right – especially after the 
Saarland election in March in which the SPD suffered unexpected losses after refusing to rule 
out a coalition with Die Linke.  Tauber declared in an April interview that “there will be no 
election campaign against the AfD” and “the question is as always whether a Christian 
Democrat or a Social Democrat will sit in the chancellor’s office” – whereby “The CDU says 
very clearly that there will be no alliance with the populists of the right and the left, that is 
the AfD and the Left Party.  Here, the SPD is blind in one eye” (Rheinische Post 2017).  
Angela Merkel (2017) declared in a similar vein at her annual press conference: “Indeed the 
CDU says, the Union of CDU/CSU says: We will not work with the AfD and we will not 
work with Die Linke.  Social Democracy, unfortunately, has not made such a clear statement 
in both directions.”  In a sense, the CDU’s anti-populism was a continuation of the party’s 
anti-communist “Red Socks” strategy in the 1990s of painting the threat of an SPD alliance 
with the PDS (the legal successor of the East German ruling party and predecessor of Die 
Linke), but the threat had a new name – populism – that could travel from the left to the far 
right.  Schulz, for his part, while not definitively ruling out a range of options including 
coalitions with Die Linke and the Greens or with the Greens and the FDP, expressed a 
preference for a “Grand Coalition under SPD leadership” in May after losing three 
consecutive state-level elections to the CDU, thus renouncing an agonistic left vs. right bloc 
strategy and circumscribing the extent to which he could position himself as a challenger to 
Merkel in the context of the more directly counter-hegemonic challenges of the AfD and 
Die Linke.  
 On the right, the AfD (2017) presented a joint articulation of populism and 
reductionism that opposed the central signifier “Volk” to “a small, powerful political oligarchy” 
                                                
6 In response to Wagenknecht, Riexinger made clear the limits on the articulation of the party’s constitutive 
outside: “We do not criticize Ms. Merkel for not closing the borders or even introducing reception camps or 
similar things” (Die Zeit 2017). 
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that had to be reined in through limitations on the power and funding of political parties, 
term limits, and referendums through which “The people must once again become sovereign” 
– while also reducing it to a nativist essence under threat from a “peoples’ migration,” 
highlighting the need for “self-preservation, not self-destruction of our state and people.”  
The people-oligarchy opposition meant that the AfD discourse exhibited an arguably 
stronger populist structuration than their Dutch and French far-right counterparts, but also 
with a more strongly reductionist closure from other “peoples” deemed fundamentally 
incompatible with an a priori differentially inscribed essence of “our people.”  This reduction 
was radicalized – i.e. the constitutive exclusion extended from the threat of future migration 
onto domestic targets on ethnic grounds – when Gauland responded to federal Integration 
Commissioner Aydan Özoguz (SPD), who denied the very existence of such an a priori 
essence in arguing that “A specifically German culture is, beyond the language, simply not 
identifiable,” by stating that “we […] can dispose of her in Anatolia,” and when party co-
chair Jörg Meuthen asserted in the election night party leaders’ debate that “A successive 
dissolution of our nation” is taking place, supposedly proven by the fact that “Germans” are 
“only sporadically” visible in inner cities (Augsburger Allgemeine 2017; Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 2017).  Amid all this, it is worth noting how the AfD’s discourse sought to dislocate 
the crisis management politics of the Merkel cabinets on both the euro (the AfD’s founding 
terrain) and refugee policy: the AfD (2017), in supporting withdrawal from the Eurozone, 
held that the euro had become a “transfer union” due to “liability for the debts of other 
countries” – which Merkel (2010) had precisely said would be avoided thanks to German 
support for the First Economic Adjustment Program for Greece in May 2010 (“Concretely, 
there was the threat of a path to a transfer union […] This had to be avoided”) – and 
demanded “The borders must be immediately closed” in order to end “uncontrolled mass 
immigration” that only heightens rather than solves demographically rooted “problems of 
the social security systems.” 
 Die Linke (2017), with the campaign slogan “Socially. Just. Peace. For All,” structured 
its campaign discourse around the dual nodal points “social justice” and “all [people],” thus 
aiming at radicalizing (i.e. extending onto a more far-reaching chain of demands) the Schulz 
SPD’s nodal point “justice” while displacing the AfD’s populist-reductionist frontier onto an 
opposition between “mak[ing] the future for the people [die Menschen] more just and better” 
on the one hand and “the rich and powerful” on the other, including “the upper ten 
thousand,” “corporations, super-rich, and their political allies,” and “economic power 
translat[ing] itself into political power.”  The structuring function of the opposition between 
“people” and profit interests came out in slogans such as “People and nature before profits” 
and “For a Europe of the people instead of the banks and businesses,” which headlined a 
wide range of demands for democratizing the economy, environmental justice, and an end to 
“the cuts diktat in Europe that is being pushed forward especially by Germany” (Die Linke 
2017).  The party directly confronted Merkel’s technocratic discourse of a “market-conform 
democracy,” blaming it for a “crisis of democracy” and “the rise of right-wing populists” (Die 
Linke 2017) – thus reaffirming the negative equivalential relation of neo-liberalism and right-
wing populism via direct causal link.  On refugee policy, the party’s policy was headlined by 
the slogans “Defend and expand the right to asylum” and “Fight flight causes and not 
refugees!” Petra Pau, the party’s lead candidate in Berlin, heightened the element of left-wing 
humanist populism by declaring at multiple rallies around the city (at which the author was 
present) that the election will be about “whether Article 1 of the Basic Law still holds: ‘The 
dignity of the human being is inviolable.’  I emphasize: Of all people, not only of the wealthy 
and beautiful, not only of the whites and Germans” – thus explicitly countering the attempt 
at reductionist closure in the AfD discourse. 
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 The German case, then, points to a clear clash of competing populisms of the left and 
right, which interpellated very different popular subjects – “all people” understood as human 
subjects on the one hand and an ethnically reductionist “Volk” on the other – against a 
power bloc, while the CDU deployed an anti-populist frontier in order to interpellate the 
SPD as its primary, albeit weaker, challenger, coupled with a continuation of the differential-
technocratic promise of solving problems as “the best answer to every form of populism” 
(Christlich-Demokratische Union 2016).  The SPD, while actively deploying the nodal point 
“justice” (“Time for more justice”), was veritably squeezed between Die Linke’s 
radicalization of “justice” discourse, which it chose not to bind equivalentially into a left-wing 
agonistic bloc against the right, and the CDU’s anti-populist frontier that it failed to displace.  
The AfD and Die Linke presented very different counter-hegemonic challenges, with the AfD 
notably displacing Merkel’s long-standing technocratic promise of “no transfer union” onto 
opposition to the euro as a de facto transfer union and pursuing radical opposition to “mass 
migration,” while Die Linke consistently structured its opposition to the crisis management 
politics of the Merkel cabinets around the “social justice” interests of “all people” against 
power and profit interests. 
 
Conclusion 
A number of patterns emerge in the three cases examined here: in all of them, the strongest 
forms of populist discursive structuration are to be found on the left, with all three left-wing 
populist discourses deploying more traditionally socialist nodal points such as “social justice” 
or “solidarity” alongside the name of a “people” against a power bloc defined in economic 
and political terms.  It is worth emphasizing that the main far-right discourses in the 
Netherlands and France were primarily nationalist (or civilizationist) rather than populist – 
and, indeed, were interpellated as “nationalist” by opposing discourses in the French case; 
while this has been demonstrated here from a discourse analytic perspective that emphasizes 
a central opposition of people vs. power as the key element of populism, the wider 
argument holds that there is little analytical value in conflating “populism” with promises to 
cleanse the Netherlands of “Islam” or to lead a “civilizational” struggle of “patriots” against 
“globalists.”  The AfD in Germany, on the other hand, displayed a particularly high degree of 
reductionist closure of its “people” onto an ethnically defined essence, continuing a trend in 
its discourse since the leadership coup of 2015 (Kim 2017).  When we move to populism as 
a discursive effect of anti-populism as opposed to an analytical category, we can see that anti-
populist logics tended to reduce “populism” onto the threat of Wilders in the Netherlands – 
which was tied to an extension of technocratic crisis management discourse in the VVD case 
and to an agonistic left vs. right frontier in GreenLeft – and equivalentially linked the left and 
far right as part of the German CDU’s strategy of interpellating the SPD as its main 
opponent that is unable to uphold the same anti-populist frontier of legitimate democratic 
politics.  The virtual absence of anti-populism in France is perhaps indicative of the sheer lack 
of candidates in this electoral cycle willing to assume a subject position of incumbent power, 
with Socialist Party (PS) candidate Benoit Hamon openly renouncing much of his party’s 
record in government; indeed, it was up to Fillon – the former prime minister under Sarkozy 
– to show even a glimmer of anti-populism, even as he himself, much like Sarkozy, made use 
of a populist logic of incorporating part of the FN’s constitutive outside. 
 Apart from the French exception, therefore, it can be seen that anti-populism indeed 
functions as a key extension of hegemonic crisis management discourses built on the 
technocratic promise to lead the country (or Europe as a whole) out of the “crisis” and, in 
its latest iteration, to guard it from the threat of “populism.”  Even in the French case, 
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Macron’s temporary use of populism extended a key element of the predecessor 
government’s agenda – namely, far-ranging liberalization of the labor market – while 
presenting itself as capable of stopping the FN where “the system” cannot.  Indeed, the 
manner in which Macron, the technocrat from the financial sector and a former minister in a 
cabinet of technocrats, temporarily assumed the role of populist tribune has a symptomatic 
quality for how neo-liberal post-politics takes on antagonistic confrontation, if only 
temporarily, as an extension of its hegemonic defense of the dominant economic rationality: 
one need only look at the campaign speech in which Macron waves his arms passionately and 
thunders at the prospect of Le Pen coming to power: “Pas ça, pas ça, pas ça!”  There is 
hardly a better illustration for the Lacanian symptom as a locus of jouissance and a 
mechanism of ideological fantasy: the candidate who knows he is putting on a show just for 
the election cycle, but also all those who rise behind him in rapturous applause and the 
millions who voted for him knowing exactly what they were getting – they are all “enjoying 
their symptom” in the shadow of the European crisis. 
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POPULISMUS: POPULIST DISCOURSE AND DEMOCRACY 
Populism is dynamically and unexpectedly back on the agenda. Latin American 
governments dismissing the so-called "Washington consensus" and extreme right-
wing parties and movements in Europe advancing xenophobic and racist 
stereotypes have exemplified this trend. Emerging social movements and parties in 
Southern Europe that resisted the current administration of the global financial 
crisis as well as the Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders presidential candidacies in 
the US have also been branded "populist". The POPULISMUS research project 
involved a comparative mapping of the populist discourse articulated by such 
sources in order to facilitate a reassessment of the category of "populism" and to 
develop a theoretical approach capable of reorienting the empirical analysis of 
populist ideologies in the global environment of the 21st century. Building on the 
theoretical basis offered by the discourse theory developed by the so-called "Essex 
School", POPULISMUS endorses a discursive methodological framework in order 
to explore the multiple expressions of populist politics, to highlight the need to 
study the emerging cleavage between populism and anti-populism and to assess the 
effects this has on the quality of democracy. Through the dissemination of its 
research findings we anticipate that the synthetic analysis of populist discourse it 
puts forward and the emerging evaluation of populism’s complex and often 
ambivalent relationship with democracy will advance the relevant scientific 
knowledge, also enabling the deepening of democratic culture in times of crisis. 
